Systems and methods for the generation and usage of authentication images in conjunction with low-resolution print devices

ABSTRACT

Systems and methods applicable, for instance, to the generation and usage of authentication images. In one aspect, unauthorized attempts to duplicate authentication images can be thwarted. In another aspect, there can be provision for authorized authentication image generation using low-resolution print devices.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application Ser.No. 63/395,483, filed Aug. 5, 2022, the contents of which are herebyincorporated by reference in their entirety and for all purposes.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present disclosure relates generally to authentication images, andmore specifically, but not exclusively, to systems and methods for thegeneration and usage of authentication images in conjunction withlow-resolution print devices (e.g., home/office printers andlow-resolution industrial printers).

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Authentication images can serve many useful purposes. For example, anauthentication image affixed to an item (and/or to packaging materialsthereof) can serve to indicate that the item is genuine. Suchauthentication image usage can be particularly useful in connection withitems that are often the target of counterfeiters. Aircraft parts,pharmaceuticals, sports memorabilia items, luxury watches, and designerhandbags are but a few of the items that fall into such a category.

However, where authentication images are used in this way, theauthentication images themselves can be the subject of unauthorizedduplication. Indeed, a counterfeiter could potentially lend credence toa counterfeit item by affixing to it a counterfeit authentication image.Here, increases in the capabilities of low-resolution print devices(e.g., home/office printers and low-resolution industrial printers) andof home/office capture equipment—along with decreases in the pricesthereof—have served to make potential tools for the unauthorizedduplication of authentication images readily available.

From a different vantage point though, allowing for the authorizedprinting of an authentication image using a low-resolution print devicecould prove useful under various circumstances. However, conventionalapproaches do not provide for authentication image generation that canon one hand be successfully performed by a low-resolution print devicewhen authorized. But, on the other, hand that yields an authenticationimage that cannot be the subject of unauthorized duplication using, say,a home/office scanner in conjunction with a low-resolution print device.

In view of the foregoing, a need exists for improved systems and methodsfor implementing authentication images, in an effort to overcome theaforementioned obstacles and deficiencies of conventional approaches.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The patent or application file contains at least one drawing executed incolor. Copies of this patent or patent application publication withcolor drawing(s) will be provided by the Office upon request and paymentof the necessary fee.

FIG. 1 is an illustration showing an authentication image including avisible target, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 2 is a representation of a computer having performed a contourextraction, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 3 is distance-from-center-point plot, according to variousembodiments.

FIG. 4 is an illustration showing a QR code in comparison to anauthentication image, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 5 is an illustration showing an authentication image including abackground image and multiple latent images, according to variousembodiments.

FIG. 6 is an illustration showing a thwarted attempt to duplicate anauthentication image, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 7 is an illustration showing depictions of an uncompensated printfile and various prints thereof, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 8 is an illustration showing further authentication imagesincluding visible targets, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 9 is an illustration showing consistent image elements and variableimage elements, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 10 is an illustration showing depictions of authentication imagesincluding visible images, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 11 is an illustration showing depictions of microtext, according tovarious embodiments.

FIG. 12 is an illustration showing depictions of supplemental imageelements, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 13 is an illustration depicting compound image elements, accordingto various embodiments.

FIG. 14 is an illustration depicting visible targets, according tovarious embodiments.

FIG. 15 is an illustration depicting an authentication image printedusing a custom font/character set approach, according to variousembodiments.

FIG. 16 is an illustration depicting QR codes along with authenticationimages, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 17 is an illustration depicting an authentication image printedusing invisible colorant, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 18 is an illustration depicting usage of a laser ablation approach,according to various embodiments.

FIG. 19 is an illustration depicting onscreen authentication images,according to various embodiments.

FIG. 20 is an illustration depicting an onscreen authentication image,and authentication images generated using print and/or laser, accordingto various embodiments.

FIG. 21 shows an example computer, according to various embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

According to various embodiments, systems and methods can be employed togenerate and utilize authentication images. Such an authentication imagecan be made up of one or more latent images, and one or more backgroundimages. As just some examples, the one or more latent images can servefunctions including but not limited to demonstrating an item to whichthe authentication image is affixed or emblazoned to be an original orauthentic item, and/or granting a privilege (e.g., access to a museum,concert, or sporting event). The one or more background images can, asjust some examples, serve to camouflage the one or more latent images tothe human eye, and/or to thwart attempts to duplicate the authenticationimage. Such thwarting can arise from the authentication image generationapproaches leveraging inadequacies and/or idiosyncrasies of equipment(e.g., home/office scanners, copiers, smartphone cameras, standalonedigital cameras, home/office printers, and/or low-resolution industrialprinters) that could be plied by individuals endeavoring to reproducethe authentication image. Where such unauthorized reproduction isattempted, the result can be an image distinguishable from the originalauthentication image, thus signaling a non-original authenticationimage. Still, despite the camouflage and duplication-thwarting abilitiesof the background images, the one or more latent images of theauthentication image can nevertheless be extracted using acamera-equipped smartphone (or other device). Further, in variousembodiments a visible target (e.g., a plus-shaped visible target) can belocated in or adjacent to the authentication image. The visible targetcan provide benefits including aiding in performing extraction of thelatent images from the authentication image.

In various embodiments, the one or more background images and the one ormore latent images of an authentication image can be formulated usingsets of image elements. The image elements of a given set can share agiven angular arrangement, and can formulate either a background image(or a portion thereof) or a latent image (or a portion thereof). As justan illustration, an authentication image can be made up of imageelements that are arranged at or near 90 degrees and which form abackground image, and image elements that are arranged at or near 45degrees and which form a latent image. Here, authorized software (e.g.,an authorized app running on a smartphone and/or software running on acentral computer or website) can utilize knowledge of the 90 degreeangular arrangement of the image elements that make up the backgroundimage, and of the 45 degree angular arrangement of the image elementsthat make up the latent image, to subtract the background image from theauthentication image, thereby yielding the latent image. As just someexamples, the image elements can be lines, line segments, dots, spots,or non-imaged areas (e.g., white spaces). The image elements can bestraight, intermittent, modulated (e.g., wavy and/or thickness/thinnessmodulated), and/or contain noise. The image elements can be of variousshapes. As just some examples, the dots can be circular, the dots can besquare, the non-images areas can be circular, and/or the non-imagedareas can be square.

In various embodiments a latent image can consist of image elements thatare situated in between (or adjacent to) image elements that are spacedat or about 150 to at or about 300 lines per inch. In other embodiments,other lines per inch spacing ranges than at or about 70 to at or about300 lines per inch can be used. Also, in various embodiments, backgroundimages can be situated around and/or integrated with latent images.

Authentication images and visible targets can be printed, as just someexamples, utilizing traditional presses, digital presses, laserprinters, using inkjet printers, using split fountain methods, usingsimulated split fountain methods, and/or via laser etching. Further,authentication images and visible targets can be single or multicolor.The printing can, in various embodiments, be over one or moresubstrates, such as white and/or toned substrates. Authentication imagesand visible targets can be printed via bitmap approaches and/or viacustom font/character set approaches. Custom font/character setapproaches are discussed in greater detail hereinbelow. Also, printingof authentication images and visible targets can be directed bycomputers including personal computers, factory computers, andsmartphones. Where, for example, a smartphone is used, an app running onthe smartphone can receive data utilizable for printing anauthentication image and/or visible target from a central computer orwebsite.

As an example, an authentication image can include image elements thatare arranged at or near 90 degrees (or 0 degrees) and which form abackground image, and image elements that are arranged at or near 45degrees and which form a latent image. Here, the at or near 90 degree(or 0 degree) background image can yield benefits including: a)camouflaging the latent image; b) creating distortions that carry overthe latent image; c) making the latent image not visible to the humaneye, a scanning device, or a camera; and d) causing attempts to capture(e.g., via scanner or smartphone camera) the image elements to fail,resulting in the capture of an image with fewer than the intended imageelements (or different than the intended image elements), thus signalinga non-original authentication image. In this example, image elements forthe background image are arranged at or near 90 degrees (or 0 degrees),and image elements for the latent image are arranged at or near 45degrees. However, in various embodiments other values can be used forthe two angles. Also, in this example the authentication image includesa single latent image. However, in various embodiments theauthentication image can include several latent images. The severallatent images can, as one example, have their image elements arranged atthe same degree value (e.g., there can be two latent images, each madeup of image elements arranged at or near 45 degrees). As anotherexample, one or more of the several latent images can have their imageelements arranged at different degree values (e.g., there can be twolatent images, with the first made up of image elements arranged at ornear 45 degrees, and the second made up of image elements arranged at adifferent degree value). In various embodiments, where multiple latentimages are employed, one or more of the latent images can be split apartin their color makeup (e.g., such that one or more sections thereofappear in two or more colors).

As another example, an authentication image can include: a) imageelements that are arranged at or near 45 degrees and which form a firstbackground image; b) image elements that are arranged at or near 90 (or0 degrees) degrees and which form a second background image; and c)image elements that are arranged at or near 135 degrees and which form alatent image. Here, the at or near 45 degree first background image andthe at or near 90 degree (or 0 degrees) second background image canyield benefits including those noted above (e.g., making the latentimage not visible to the human eye, a scanning device, or a camera). Inthis example, image elements for the first background image are arrangedat or near 45 degrees, image elements for the second background imageare arranged at or near 90 degrees (or 0 degrees), and image elementsfor the latent image are arranged at or near 135 degrees. However, invarious embodiments other values can be used for the three angles. Also,in this example the authentication image includes a single latent image.However, in various embodiments the authentication image can, in amanner analogous to that discussed above, include several latent images.Accordingly, as just one example, there can be two latent images, eachmade up of image elements arranged at or near 135 degrees. Furtheraccordingly, as just another example, there can be two latent images,with the first made up of image elements arranged at or near 135degrees, and the second made up of image elements arranged at adifferent degree value.

Although authentication images have been discussed herein as being madeup of one or more latent images and one or more background images, otherpossibilities exist for applying the approaches discussed herein. Forexample, authentication images can, as an alternative to or in additionto including one or more background images, include one or more graphicoverlays. Such graphic overlays can be implemented in a manner generallyanalogous to that discussed herein with respect to background images.However, in various embodiments background images can be situated behindlatent images graphic overlays can be situated in front of latentimages.

In various embodiments, a visible target can be located in or adjacentto an authentication image. A visible target can, as just some examples,aid in the detection, filtration, and/or decoding of a correspondingauthentication image. As just some further examples, a visible targetcan assist in functions, such as glare detection and automatic zooming,that can make use of the location of the visible target. A visibletarget can, as just some examples, make use of black and white, colors,and/or pairings of high-contrast colors.

A visible target, which can also be referred to as a proof locator, can,as just an example, be a plus-shaped image. Further, the visible targetcan have one or more distinct attributes. In various embodiments, thesedistrict attributes can be known to software running on acamera-equipped smartphone (or other device) that is to performextraction (or other operations). These extraction operations (or otheroperations) can include operations performed with respect to anauthentication image to which the visible target corresponds. Suchknowledge can assist the software in performing the extraction (or otheroperations). The distinct attributes can, as just some examples, includeone or more of: a) size of the visible target relative to thecorresponding authentication image; b) position of the visible target inor adjacent to the corresponding authentication image; c) a distinctand/or specific white space configuration of the visible target; and d)a distinct and/or specific width of an outlined rule of the visibletarget. Various colors can be used for the outlined rule. For instance,the outlined rule can be black. Shown in FIG. 1 is a zoomed-in view of avisible target 103 of an example authentication image 101.

A visible target can take the geometric form of a plus shape. Such plusshape can, for instance be a cross with four arms of equal (or nearequal) length. The use of a plus shape for the visible target can yieldbenefits including balance of simplicity and distinction. For instance,because the plus shape is a simple and distinct shape it can beevaluated mathematically for fast performance when processing largeamounts of contours extracted from a high-resolution camera image. Suchoperations and the capture of such an image can be performed, forinstance, by a smartphone.

According to various embodiments, a smartphone (or other computer) canact to detect a visible target from a camera image by first performing acontour extraction operation on the image. Subsequently, the smartphone(or other computer) can, for each of some or all of the extractedcontours, measure the distances of the points of that contour from thecenter of that contour. Where a given contour is a visible target, suchdistance from center point determination can yield a pattern indicativethereof. In various embodiments, when ascertaining a given contour to bea visible target, the smartphone (or other computer) can ascertain thelocation of the visible target contour within the image.

For example, shown in FIG. 2 is a representation 201 of a smartphone (orother computer) having performed such a contour extraction operation onan image (e.g., on a smartphone-captured image). As depicted by FIG. 2 ,the extracted contours include contour 203 corresponding to a visibletarget, and contours 205 corresponding to other than the visible target(e.g., contours corresponding to noise). Then, shown in FIG. 3 is adistance-from-center-point plot 301 for an extracted contour whichcorresponds to a visible target. Here, the plot exhibits a patternindicative of the extracted contour corresponding to a plus-shapedvisible target. With respect to FIG. 3 , it is noted that the number ofpoints that correspond to the plus-shaped visible target within the plotcan vary. But, the plus-shaped visible target can nevertheless exhibitwithin the plot a pattern of four evenly distributed peaks and valleys.In various embodiments, evaluation of the peaks and valleys can be madeby utilizing the halfway value between the minimum distance from thecenter to the maximum distance from the center.

As another example advantage of utilizing a plus-shaped visible target,such plus shape can retain detectable form down to a very small scale.As such, benefits such as providing a wider range of proximity in whichto detect the visible target can accrue. Additionally, where a plusshape is used for the visible target, the uniformity of the arms of theplus can be used by the smartphone (or other computer) to determine theexterior points of the corresponding authentication image. Theseexterior points can, as just one example, be used in areverse-transformation from perspective/3D space to 2D space. Once thesmartphone (or other computer) has translated the authentication imagein this way, the smartphone (or other computer) can apply filtration toenhance the information for readability. As yet another exampleadvantage of utilizing a plus-shaped visible target, the discretecontrast offered by such a visible target's unprinted area outlined bythe visible target's printed area can offer a device camera (e.g., asmartphone's camera) an optimal (or near-optimal) visual component toauto-focus on at a close distance from the visible target.

Once the smartphone (or other computer) has determined a given contourto be a visible target, and/or has determined the location of thevisible target within the captured image, various supporting functions(e.g., supporting app functions) can be employed to aid one or more of:a) operations performed by the smartphone (or other computer) withrespect to the authentication image (e.g., yielding a latent image fromthe authentication image); and/or b) user experience. One examplesupporting function is glare detection. Such glare detection can includeidentifying an intense (e.g., the most intense) point of brightness onthe captured image in relation to the location of the visible target anda surmised area of the authentication image surrounding the visibletarget (e.g., surmised utilizing one or more of the above-noted distinctattributes of the visible target). Another example supporting functionis an auto-zoom feature. Such auto-zoom feature can include increasingand/or decreasing camera zoom according to an optimal size (or nearoptimal size) for filtration, extraction, and/or decoding. Such zoom ofthe camera can be useful, for instance, for capturing small and/or denseinformation of an authentication image.

The combination of the inner white space of the visible target and thesurrounding color of the visible target can, in various embodiments,provide a contrast basis with which the authentication image can beassessed by the smartphone (or other computer). As just an illustration,the center of the visible target being white, and/or the knock-out colorof a corresponding print design, can provide a baseline color value withwhich to perform filtration (e.g., binary thresholding), and/or can beused when calculating various aspects of the authentication image (e.g.,printed/unprinted ratio).

With reference to FIG. 4 , it is noted that a further advantage ofutilizing a plus shape for the visible target can include it having thepotential for being visually recognizable and/or iconic, such as whenthe visible target is deployed in consumer-facing applications. Forinstance, consider that one of the most familiar consumer-orientedinformation marks is the QR code 401. The QR code has goodrecognizability to the public, with its iconic form of four blockyanchor points with one as an anchor. Then, further consider that theauthentication image discussed herein (e.g., as depicted in FIG. 4 asauthentication image 403): a) has the capability of printing muchsmaller than a QR code; and b) achieves its own iconic look with, invarious embodiments, a plus-shaped visible target at its center. Assuch, the authentication image discussed herein has the potential forbeing at least as visually recognizable and/or iconic as the QR code, ifnot more so.

In some embodiments, an authentication image can be printed using abitmap approach. In other embodiments, an authentication image can beprinted using a custom font/character set approach. Such a customfont/character set approach can include, for example, formulating acustom font and/or character set made up of characters that each provideone or more image elements of the sort discussed herein, or portionsthereof. Such a custom font/character set approach can be used both whenprinting authentication images that include visible targets of the sortdiscussed herein, and when printing authentication images that do notinclude visible targets. When such a custom font/character set approachis used in printing an authentication image that does include a visibletarget, the custom characters can be used both in printing the visibletarget component of the authentication image, and when printing othercomponents of the authentication image. In some embodiments, avector-based approach can be used in the creation of the customfont/character set. In other embodiments, a raster-based approach can beused in the creation of the custom font/character set. However, avector-based approach can have a potential for yielding more consistentresults than a raster-based approach.

Printing an authentication image using a custom font/character setapproach can yield various advantages. For example, printing anauthentication image in this way (e.g., when using a vector-basedapproach) does not require knowledge of printer resolution (or otherprinter specifics) in order to print authentication images across avariety of print devices. Another example advantage of printing anauthentication image using a custom font/character set approach is thatthe number of lines per inch of the authentication image can be changedby changing the size of characters used to compose the authenticationimage.

Then, yet another example advantage of printing an authentication imageusing a custom font/character set approach is that of variability whencreating the authentication image. In particular, because theauthentication image can be composed of custom characters of the sortnoted, there is not call that an individual bitmap be generated for eachauthentication image. Further in particular, because the authenticationimage can be composed of custom characters of the sort noted,authentication image creation using variable data can be performed(e.g., with the number of characters and/or their positions within theauthentication image being variably printed). Additionally inparticular, because the authentication image can be composed of customcharacters of the sort noted, easier variability when incorporatingbackground image camouflage features can be achieved (e.g., by variablyprinting the number of characters and/or positions of characters used toform the background image(s)).

Further, an additional example advantage of printing an authenticationimage using a custom font/character set approach is that of easierand/or faster authentication image generation (e.g., once the customcharacter set has been built, generation of an authentication imagemainly calls for merely placing appropriate characters of the pre-builtset). Yet another example advantage of printing an authentication imageusing a custom font/character set approach is that of flexibility interms of authentication image structure. For instance, custom screeningpatterns can be used in creation of characters, including a variety ofangle combinations and line thickness modulations. As such, screeningoptions of characters can advantageously be not dependent onconventional screening. Custom screening patterns can, as just someexamples, achieve not only efficient readability (e.g., when utilizingan app running on a smartphone), but also increased distortion whenunauthorized duplication attempts are made.

Another example advantage of printing an authentication image using acustom font/character set approach is that the area of theauthentication image can be increased. In particular, for instance, theuse of a custom font/character set to composite an authentication imageallows the location of the latent image portions thereof to be morereadily ascertained.

Shown in FIG. 5 is an example authentication image 501 including abackground image 503 formed using image elements that are arranged at ornear 90 degrees, and further including latent images 505A/505B formedusing image elements that are arranged at or near 45 degrees. Then,shown in FIG. 6 is the result of a thwarted attempt to duplicate theauthentication image of FIG. 5 . Here, because of the authenticationimage approaches discussed herein, the attempt has failed, resulting inthe capture of an image 601 with other than the intended image elements,thus signaling a non-original authentication image.

Also, an authentication image can be authenticated by analyzing thewidth/spacing (and/or angle) of the image elements that make up theauthentication image. The analysis can be performed by authorizedsoftware (e.g., an authorized app running on a smartphone). As oneexample, the analysis can determine whether the width/spacing (and/orangle) of the image elements is consistent globally (or nearlyconsistent globally) throughout the authentication image. As anotherexample, the analysis can determine whether the width/spacing (and/orangle) of the image elements exhibits regular variability globally (ornear regular variability globally) throughout the authentication image.Here, the analysis can leverage inadequacies and/or idiosyncrasies oflow-resolution print devices that would cause an unauthorized printingof a duplicated authentication image to not match an original of thatauthentication image in terms of image element width/spacing (and/orangle). Still, authorized printing of an authentication image bylow-resolution print devices can be provided for by implementingapproaches that compensate for the inadequacies and/or idiosyncrasies ofthese print devices. In this way, such low-resolution print devices canprint authentication images exhibiting image element width/spacing(and/or angle) that satisfy the noted authentication analysis. It isnoted that low-resolution print devices, as discussed hereinthroughout,can include home/office printers and low-resolution industrial printers.

Turning to FIG. 7 , shown is a depiction of an uncompensated print file701 for an authentication image. Also shown in FIG. 7 are: a) adepiction 703 of the uncompensated print file 701 as printed by a 2400dpi flexographic printer; b) a zoom 705 of the uncompensated print file701 as printed by a 600 dpi inkjet; c) a zoom 707 of the uncompensatedprint file 701 as printed by a 812 dpi liquid ink printer; and d) a zoom709 of the uncompensated print file 701 as printed by a 600 dpitoner-based laser printer.

As shown by FIG. 7 , when the uncompensated print file 701 is directlyprinted (i.e., rather than printed using a corresponding compensatedprint file as discussed hereinbelow) by the 600-dpi inkjet, the printresult includes rough line edges 711 and bent lines 713. These roughline edges 711 and bent lines 713 cause the print result to not matchthe uncompensated print file 701 in terms of image element width/spacing(and/or angle) Likewise, when the uncompensated print file 701 isprinted without compensation by the 812-dpi liquid ink printer, theprint result includes oversize lines 715 that cause the print result tonot match the uncompensated print file 701 in terms of image elementwidth/spacing (and/or angle). Further, when the uncompensated print file701 is printed without compensation by the 600-dpi toner-based laserprinter, the print result includes missing line portions 717 that causethe print result to not match the uncompensated print file 701 in termsof image element width/spacing (and/or angle). Additionally shown inFIG. 7 are: a) a zoomed-out view 719 corresponding to zoom 705; and b) adepiction 721 of the uncompensated print file 701 as printed by alow-resolution (e.g., home/office) thermal printer. As depicted by thefigure, such uncompensated prints deviate from uncompensated print file701.

As referenced, the authorized printing of an authentication image bylow-resolution print devices can be provided for. In particular, suchcan be achieved by generating a compensated print file from anuncompensated print file. Where, say, a low-resolution (e.g.,home/office) 600-dpi inkjet printer prints an authentication image byway of such a compensated print file, the print result can match (ornearly match) a corresponding uncompensated print file, due to thecompensated print file compensating for inadequacies and/oridiosyncrasies of the inkjet printer. As such, returning to the exampleof FIG. 7 the 600-dpi inkjet can generate a print result that matches(or nearly matches) flexographic print result 703, rather than the printresult of zoom 705.

The generation of a compensated print file from an uncompensated printfile can utilize one or more compensatory formulas and/or rules based onknown idiosyncrasies/inadequacies of a given low-resolution printdevice. For instance, it can be known that the low-resolution printdevice incorrectly renders an uncompensated print file by weakeninginstances of a line being situated within a certain known distance rangebetween two other lines. Here, the compensatory formulas and/or rulescan thicken these line instances in the compensated print file in such away that causes those line instances to, when printed, properly matchthe uncompensated print file.

With further regard to the formulas and/or rules, it is noted that theformulas and/or rules can dictate the thinning or thickening of printedlines, thereby allowing a low-resolution print device to generate aprint result that can satisfy a smartphone app that captures (anddetermines the validity of) authentication images by considering printconsistency of authentication image lines and angles. The formulasand/or rules can utilize various factors to determine how much to thinor thicken lines. As examples, these factors can include: a) printdevice type; b) print speed; c) print sheet width; d) ink cure and/orair dry time; e) colorant utilized (e.g., inkjet ink, traditional ink,liquid ink, and/or toner); f) substrate utilized (e.g., traditionalpaper, inkjet receptive paper, metal, and/or plastic); and/or varnishand/or aqueous coatings utilized. As just an illustration, the plasticcan be a plastic bag material such as LDPE.

As referenced above, in various embodiments an authentication image canbe printed using a custom font/character set approach. Further, such acustom font/character set approach can be used when generatingcompensated and/or uncompensated print files. For instance, the use of avector art file based on a custom font/character set can allow aconsistent line shape to be retained throughout plating and/or printingprocesses, via an outlined print file that accomplishes consistentprinting without regard to print device dpi.

Where an uncompensated print file is printed by a low-resolution printdevice, the ensuing print result can exhibit various flaws (e.g., largeamounts of spatter and/or unevenness on line edges). Due to these flaws,the ensuing print result can be expected to not scan (or notconsistently scan) as valid with a phone app. In various embodiments,the establishment of compensatory formulas and/or rules can involveutilizing an automated process that works backwards. In theseembodiments, image element width/spacing (and/or angle) can initially becreated in an original, uncompensated print file. Subsequently,operations can be performed to establish compensatory formulas and/orrules applicable to generate a final, compensated print file. Workingbackwards can include using an automated process that measures, in aprint result arising from a low-resolution print device directlyprinting an uncompensated print file, aspects such as intensity of thecolorant splatter. As examples, such colorant splatter can occur fromcolorant overspray, substrate absorption, wicking, and/or incomplete inkadherence.

Specifically, the establishment of the compensatory formulas and/orrules can seek to yield a compensated print file that, when printed by alow-resolution print device under consideration, satisfies two criteria.Firstly, that printing of the compensated print file by thelow-resolution print device yields an authentication image that staysclean enough (e.g., in terms of white space percentage to black imagepercentage ratio) to scan (and/or consistently scan) as valid with asmartphone app. And, secondly, that if an unauthorized attempt is madeto duplicate (e.g., using a home/office copier or desktop scanner) theprint result arising from the printing of the compensated print file,that such duplication will fail, with interference and/or image lossensuing. In particular, the failure can be such that the authenticationimage will not scan (and/or will not consistently scan) as valid withthe phone app. In this way, presentation of a non-genuine authenticationimage can be signaled.

Returning to FIG. 7 , also depicted is a zoom 723 of a compensated printfile as printed by the 600-dpi toner-based laser printer. Here, thecompensated print file corresponds to the uncompensated print file 701.It is observed that, due to the use of the compensated print file, thezoom 723 does not exhibit the missing line portions 717 of the zoom 709.

The discussed use of compensated print files can yield various benefits.For example, according to conventional approaches low-resolution printdevices have not been considered to be capable of being used forsecurity printing due to failings including their low dpis and theirprint processes. In particular, according to conventional approaches onorder of 2400 dpi has been considered to be the minimum dpi necessary toperform security printing. For perspective, it is noted thatdigital/thermal ink presses exhibit dpi capabilities ranging from onorder of 203 dpi to on order of 812 dpi. However, via the discussed useof compensated print files, low-resolution print devices (e.g.,low-resolution industrial printers, desktop printers, toner-basedprinters, digital inkjet presses, and pad printing presses) can be usedfor security printing (e.g., allowing for home printing of a theaterticket that includes an authentication image). Beyond allowing securityprinting to be performed using low-resolution print devicesconventionality considered incapable of that task, as another examplebenefit via the discussed use of compensated print files variouscolorants (e.g., home/office colorants and colorants used in conjunctionwith low-resolution industrial printers) conventionality consideredincapable of being used for security printing (e.g., due to the splatterthat they exhibit) can be used. In this way the use of such colorants(e.g., inkjet fluids, toner, and liquid inks) can be enabled, whereintaglio, flexographic, and/or offset inks were traditionally thoughtrequired. As a further example benefit, via the discussed use ofcompensated print files various substrates (e.g., home/office substratesand substrates used in conjunction with low-resolution industrialprinters) conventionality considered incapable of being used forsecurity printing (e.g., due to their absorption characteristics) can beused for this purpose. As just some examples, such substrates caninclude thermal print papers, fabrics, polyesters, rough/ coarsesurfaced substrates, and/or porous surfaced substrates. Traditionally,low resolution printers (especially desktop units) have been excludedfrom printing security features because of their inability to accuratelyproduce a consistent, effective, smartphone authenticatable image.However, via the discussed use of compensated print files thislimitation can be overcome. More generally, the functionality discussedherein can yield an authentication image that contains image elementsthat affect the consistency of print colorant applied to and/or absorbedby a substrate such that: a) unauthorized copying of the authenticationimage is impeded; and b) analysis software (e.g., running on asmartphone) can determine that the authentication image is not genuine,and can signal such to a user. The configuration of such image elementscan be termed intentional spacing.

As discussed above, in various embodiments a visible target can belocated in or adjacent to the authentication image. Shown in FIG. 8 is avisible target 801 that is situated adjacent to (and in particularadjacent and at a corner of) an authentication image 803. According tothe example of FIG. 8 , the visible target 801 takes the form of acharacter, in particular the letter “M.” Additionally shown in FIG. 8 isa visible target 805 that is situated in an authentication image 807.According to the example of FIG. 8 , the visible target 805 takes theform of a plus shape. The use of a visible target can yield benefitsincluding aiding the ability of a smartphone (or other capture device)to locate, orient, focus, detect glare and/or adjust captured imagecontrast levels. Still further shown in FIG. 8 is a visible target 804that is situated in the authentication image 803.

As discussed, authentication of an authentication image can includedetermining whether image element width/spacing (and/or angle) isconsistent globally throughout an authentication image. As alsodiscussed, such authentication can include determining whether imageelement width/spacing (and/or angle) exhibits regular variabilityglobally throughout an authentication image. Shown in FIG. 9 is anexample authentication image 901 in which the width and spacing of bothprint and white space is consistent globally throughout authenticationimage 901. In this way, the consistency of the width and spacing of theimage elements of authentication image 901 lends itself to on one handauthenticity determination, and on the other hand to destruction of aduplicated authentication image. Then, also shown in FIG. 9 is anexample authentication image 903 in which the width, spacing, and angleof image elements varies globally throughout authentication image 903.Here, the variability of the width, spacing, and angle of the imageelements of authentication image 903 lends itself to on one handauthenticity determination and on the other hand to destruction of aduplicated authentication image. Additionally shown in FIG. 9 is a zoom905 of authentication image 903.

With further regard to the discussed variability, it is noted that therelation of any image element to any other image element can be variablewithin an authentication image. In this regard, shown in FIG. 9 is anexample of image elements 907 being variable within an authenticationimage to image elements 909. Also in this regard, shown in FIG. 9 is afurther example of image elements 911 being variable within anauthentication image to image elements 913.

An authentication image can include a visible graphic (e.g., visible tothe naked eye). In particular, various properties of image elements ofthe authentication image can be variable and integrated throughout theauthentication image so as to create the visible graphic. The visiblegraphic can, for instance, be a logo, an emblem, a design, or atrademark. Shown in FIG. 10 is an example authentication image thatincludes a soccer ball visible image 1001. The soccer ball visible image1001 arises from the noted application of image elements. Also shown inFIG. 10 is an example authentication image that includes a lock visibleimage 1003 that arises from the noted application of image elements.

An authentication image can include non-segmented and/or segmented imageelements that are placed at or near a given print density (e.g., at ornear a print density under 30%). In this way, the image elements can,when subjected to unauthorized duplication, disappear, distort, and/orexhibit a shift in color hue. In some embodiments the image elements canform one or more microimage, microdot, and/or microtext instances thatare viewable under magnification in an authorized print (e.g., printedusing a compensated print file).

As an example, using this approach placed rows of dot image elements canform microtext (e.g., the letters “AUT” signifying an authenticatedimage). This microtext can change hue, distort, and/or disappear uponunauthorized copy or scanning. Turning FIG. 11 , shown is a cropped view1101 of an authorized print of microtext. Then, view 1103 shows a zoomof the authorized microtext print. Where an unauthorized copy is made,the microtext can disappear.

Also, an authentication image can include supplemental image elements.These supplemental image elements can be placed out of sync with theangulation of other image elements of the authentication image. Becauseunauthorized copying distorts image elements of an authentication image,such supplemental image elements can be distorted in an unauthorizedcopy. As just some examples, supplemental image elements can be situatedwith: a) latent images; b) background images; and/or c) characters. Thenoted out of sync placement of supplemental image elements can includeturning, tipping, and/or twisting of image elements that exist elsewherein in an authentication image. As an example, there can be only a singlesupplemental image element (e.g., within a latent images). As anotherexample, there can be multiple supplemental image elements.

The use of supplemental image elements in an authentication image canprovide for a covert means of authentication (e.g., by a user or bysoftware analysis). In particular, information regarding a supplementalimage element (e.g., the angle and/or location thereof) can be madeavailable (e.g., stored on a server and/or otherwise available to asmartphone app). Using this information, the supplemental image elementcan be found in an authorized print. But, due to distortion thesupplemental image element will not be locatable in an unauthorizedprint. In this way, search (e.g., by a smartphone app) for asupplemental image element can provide a covert means of authentication.

Turning to FIG. 12 , shown is an authentication image 1201 including asupplemental image element 1203. The supplemental image element 1203 isplaced out of sync with the angulation of other image elements ofauthentication image 1201. Also shown in FIG. 12 is a corresponding zoom1205. Turning further to FIG. 12 , shown is a background image 1207 thatincludes supplemental image elements 1209. As depicted by the figure,supplemental image elements 1209 are placed out of sync with theangulation of other image elements of background image 1207. Also shownin FIG. 12 is a character 1211 that includes supplemental image element1213. Supplemental image element 1213 is placed out of sync with theangulation of other image elements of character 1211.

A set of multiple image elements can be used to form a compound imageelement. An authentication image can include multiple compound imageelements. Furthermore, those image elements that form a compound imageelement can be split into separate color layers for purposes ofprinting.

The use of compound image elements in an authentication image can serveto inhibit unauthorized copying of that authentication image. Inparticular, home/office capture devices (e.g., scanners and smartphonecameras) typically capture colors individually, and partial loss of acompound image element occurs when capturing in a particular color.Also, home/office capture devices typically utilize a CMY-basedapproach. CMY-based approaches typically do not capture non-CMY imagesin their entirety. As such, where a compound image element is formed ina non-CMY fashion, such can serve to further inhibit unauthorizedauthentication image copying. Shown in FIG. 13 is an example compoundimage element 1301. The compound image element 1301 is made up of redcolor layer image elements 1303 and green color layer image elements1305. Also shown in FIG. 16 is a zoom 1307 of an authentication imagethat incorporates instances of compound image element 1301.

Turning to FIG. 14 , it is noted that a visible target can exhibitdiscrete contrast, such as discrete contrast arising from the unprintedarea of the visible target as outlined by the printed area of thevisible target. Such discrete contrast can offer a smartphone (or othercamera device) running authorized software a visual component to assistwith auto-focus, such as when the capture device is in close proximityto an authentication image that includes the visible target. Shown inFIG. 14 is an authentication image 1401 including such visible targetsin the form of: a) a visible target 1403 that is located inauthentication image 1401 and centered therewith; and b) a visibletarget 1405 that is located in authentication image 1401 and at theupper left corner thereof. Then, zoom 1407 shows detail of visibletarget 1405, and zoom 1409 shows detail of visible target 1403.

As discussed, printing an authentication image via a customfont/character set approach can allow for variability when creating theauthentication image. Using such an approach (e.g., where a vector-basedtechnique is used in creation of a custom font/character set) enablesvariable authentication images to be generated: a) using an existingdata file; b) across a variety of low-resolution print devices; and c)across a variety of home/office imaging devices. Such an existing datafile can include: a) a library of font characters; and/or b) a libraryof visible targets that are prerendered in place (pre-RIPed). Shown inFIG. 15 is a zoom 1501 of an example authentication image printed usingthe noted custom font/character set approach. In particular, within theauthentication image compound image elements 1505 of a single color(depicted as cyan here) are placed over a colorized toned area 1503 of adifferent color (depicted as light magenta here).

An authentication image can be placed within or in the vicinity of(e.g., adjacent to) a track and trace element (e.g., a bar code, a QRcode, a 2D code, or track and trace text). Alternatively oradditionally, a track and trace element can be placed within anauthentication image. The authentication image can be used indetermining the authenticity of the track and trace element. Theauthentication image, after being validated, can allow access to thetrack and trace system via the track and trace element (e.g., barcode).Thus, if the authentication image is not valid, access is not allowed.In particular, where, for instance, the authentication image scans asvalid with a phone app, the track and trace element can be consideredproper. In some embodiments, further placed in the vicinity of the trackand trace element can be a secondary track and trace numerical code.

As an example, image element width/spacing (and/or angle) can beconsistent throughout the authentication image. As another example,image element width/spacing (and/or angle) can exhibit regularvariability throughout the authentication image. In some embodiments, asmartphone app can decode such regular variability to one or more values(e.g., one or more spacing values). The smartphone app can use these oneor more values to consult a server (or other source) that maps suchvalues to secondary track and trace numerical codes. The smartphone appcan then compare a determined secondary track and trace numerical codewith a secondary track and trace numerical code placed in the vicinityof a track and trace element under consideration (e.g., a QR code underconsideration). Where the comparison yields a match, the smartphone app(or other software) can consider the track and trace element underconsideration to be proper. As an alternative, the smartphone app canpresent the determined secondary track and trace numerical code to auser.

Turning to FIG. 16 , shown is a QR code 1601, along with an adjacentauthentication image 1603, and a secondary track and trace numericalcode 1605. Also shown in FIG. 16 is a QR code 1607, along withsituated-therein authentication image 1609, and a secondary track andtrace numerical code 1611.

Additionally, an authentication image can be formulated such thatcertain portions thereof are printed using a colorant invisible underregular light, while other portions thereof are printed using a colorantthat is visible under regular light. Portions can be latent imagesand/or compound image elements. Such colorant invisible under regularlight can be ultraviolet or infrared colorant. As an illustration, withreference to FIG. 17 an authentication image 1701 can include one latentimage 1703 printed using invisible colorant, and three latent imagesprinted using visible colorant (not shown). Continuing with theillustration, an authentication image of this sort can provide for bothconsumer user and investigator user functionality within a singleauthentication image. In particular, the consumer user can present(e.g., for validity determination using smartphone app) theauthentication image under regular light. Under such regular light, thethree latent images printed using visible colorant can be exposed.Further, the investigator user can present the authentication imageunder, say, a blacklight. In this way, the investigator user can haveaccess to all four latent images.

Through the use of such approaches, various benefits can accrue.Continuing with the illustration, the regular light invisibility of thefourth latent image can lead to it remaining undetected by a consumeruser, thereby impeding attempts by the consumer user to make anunauthorized copy of the authentication image. As another example, theinclusion of a latent image typically only accessible to investigatorusers can help assure investigator users of authentication imagevalidity.

Further to printing an authentication image using a low-resolution printdevice, an authentication image can be created using laser ablation,and/or laser engraving/etching approaches. Such laser ablationapproaches can include firstly printing a solid area with blackcolorant. Subsequently the solid area can be ablated by a laser so as toyield an authentication image. Such laser engraving/etching approachescan include firstly printing a solid area with white or clear colorant.Subsequently the solid area can be engraved/etched by a laser so as toyield an authentication image. Further, these ablation and/orengraving/etching approaches can include generating one or moreuncompensated and/or compensated print files in agreement with thatwhich is discussed above (e.g., taking into account ablation and/orengraving/etching device inadequacies and/or idiosyncrasies). In thisway a laser ablation and/or engraving/etching can provide anauthentication image that on one hand stays clean enough to scan (and/orconsistently scan) as valid, but on the other hand if subjected tounauthorized duplication attempts yields an authentication image thatfails to scan (and/or consistently scan) as valid.

Also, an authentication image can be generated using both colorant(e.g., as printed by a low-resolution print device) and laser ablationand/or engraving/etching. Here, certain image elements of theauthentication image can be formed using colorant, and other imageelements of the authentication image can be formed via laser. Where bothcolorant and laser approaches are used, a certain portion (e.g., 50%) ofimage elements can be generated using the colorant approach, and acertain portion (e.g., 50%) of image elements can be generated using thelaser approach. Further the colorant-generated image elements can beconsistent and/or variable. Likewise, the laser-generated image elementscan be consistent and/or variable. As such, as just an illustration, anauthentication image can be generated wherein m % (e.g., m=50%) of theimage elements thereof are colorant-generated and consistent, and n %(e.g., n=50%) of the image elements thereof are laser-generated andvariable. As just another illustration, an authentication image can begenerated wherein m % (e.g., m=50%) of the image elements thereof arecolorant-generated and variable, and n % (e.g., n=50%) of the imageelements thereof are laser-generated and consistent. In variousembodiments where both colorant and laser approaches are used inauthentication image generation, a Datalase/SUNlase process can beemployed. Turning to FIG. 18 , depicted is an example of the discussedlaser ablation approach. Firstly, a solid area 1801 can be printed usinga black colorant. Afterwards the solid area 1801 can be laserengraved/etched so as to yield an authentication image 1803.

Further to generating an authentication image using a printer, or usingor laser ablation or engraving/etching, an onscreen authentication imagecan be created. A smartphone (or other capture device) can be pointed ata display showing such an onscreen authentication image, and a validitydetermination can be made for the onscreen authentication image. Deviceson which onscreen authentication images can be displayed for validitydetermination purposes include laptop/desktop screens, televisionscreens, smartphone (or other mobile/smart device) screens, and barcodescanner screens. As just an illustration, an onscreen authenticationimage can be displayed on a first smartphone, and a second smartphonecan be pointed at the display of the first smartphone.

Generation of an onscreen authentication image can, in a manneranalogous to that which is discussed above, include generating one ormore uncompensated and/or compensated virtual (e.g., pdf) print files.The generation of these virtual files can take into account displaydevice inadequacies and/or idiosyncrasies. As such, there can begeneration of an onscreen authentication image that on one hand staysclean enough to scan (and/or consistently scan) as valid, but on theother hand if subjected to unauthorized duplication attempts yields anauthentication image that fails to scan (and/or consistently scan) asvalid. As just some examples, like an authentication image generatedusing print and/or ablation and/or engraving/etching approaches, anonscreen authentication image can be used as a printing plate qualitycontrol (QC) image, for printed image on-press, and/or for productsundergoing a customs, distribution, brand check, and/or retailenvironment inspection.

Turning to FIG. 19 , shown are a depiction 1901 of a first exampleonscreen authentication image being displayed on a smartphone screen,and a depiction 1903 of the first example onscreen authentication imagebeing displayed on a laptop/desktop screen. Also shown in FIG. 19 is adepiction 1905 of a second example onscreen authentication image.

Moreover, authentication images generated using print and/or ablationand/or engraving/etching approaches can be used in conjunction withonscreen authentication images. As just an illustration, there can becall that a user use a smartphone to scan as valid both: a) anauthentication image generated using print, and/or ablation and/orengraving/etching approaches; and b) an onscreen authentication image.Further according to this illustration, the user can proceed in this wayin order to make an authenticity determination of a sports memorabiliaitem. Here, for instance, the authentication image generated using printand/or ablation and/or engraving/etching approaches can be attached tothe memorabilia item, and the onscreen authentication image can beprovided to the user via a text message (or via a website to which theuser is directed).

Turning to FIG. 20 , shown are: a) a depiction 2001 of an exampleonscreen authentication image; b) a first example authentication imagegenerated using print and/or ablation and/or engraving/etchingapproaches 2003; and c) a second example authentication image generatedusing print and/or ablation and/or engraving/etching approaches 2005.

Hardware and Software

According to various embodiments, various functionality discussed hereincan be performed by and/or with the help of one or more computers. Sucha computer can be and/or incorporate, as just some examples, a personalcomputer, a server, a smartphone, a system-on-a-chip, and/or amicrocontroller. Such a computer can, in various embodiments, run Linux,MacOS, Windows, or another operating system.

Such a computer can also be and/or incorporate one or more processorsoperatively connected to one or more memory or storage units, whereinthe memory or storage may contain data, algorithms, and/or program code,and the processor or processors may execute the program code and/ormanipulate the program code, data, and/or algorithms. Shown in FIG. 21is an example computer employable in various embodiments of the presentinvention. Example computer 2101 includes system bus 2103 whichoperatively connects two processors 2105 and 2107, random access memory(RAM) 2109, read-only memory (ROM) 2111, input output (I/O) interfaces2113 and 2115, storage interface 2117, and display interface 2119.Storage interface 2117 in turn connects to mass storage 2121. Each ofI/O interfaces 2113 and 2115 can, as just some examples, be a UniversalSerial Bus (USB), a Thunderbolt, an Ethernet, a Bluetooth, a Long TermEvolution (LTE), a 5G, an IEEE 488, and/or other interface. Mass storage2121 can be a flash drive, a hard drive, an optical drive, or a memorychip, as just some possibilities. Processors 2105 and 2107 can each be,as just some examples, a commonly known processor such as an ARM-basedor x86-based processor. Computer 2101 can, in various embodiments,include or be connected to a touch screen, a mouse, and/or a keyboard.Computer 2101 can additionally include or be attached to card readers,DVD drives, floppy disk drives, hard drives, memory cards, ROM, and/orthe like whereby media containing program code (e.g., for performingvarious operations and/or the like described herein) may be inserted forthe purpose of loading the code onto the computer.

In accordance with various embodiments of the present invention, acomputer may run one or more software modules designed to perform one ormore of the above-described operations. Such modules can, for example,be programmed using Python, Java, JavaScript, Swift, C, C++, C#, and/oranother language. Corresponding program code can be placed on media suchas, for example, DVD, CD-ROM, memory card, and/or floppy disk. It isnoted that any indicated division of operations among particularsoftware modules is for purposes of illustration, and that alternatedivisions of operation may be employed. Accordingly, any operationsindicated as being performed by one software module can instead beperformed by a plurality of software modules. Similarly, any operationsindicated as being performed by a plurality of modules can instead beperformed by a single module. It is noted that operations indicated asbeing performed by a particular computer can instead be performed by aplurality of computers. It is further noted that, in variousembodiments, peer-to-peer and/or grid computing techniques may beemployed. It is additionally noted that, in various embodiments, remotecommunication among software modules may occur. Such remotecommunication can, for example, involve JavaScript ObjectNotation-Remote Procedure Call (JSON-RPC), Simple Object Access Protocol(SOAP), Java Messaging Service (JMS), Remote Method Invocation (RMI),Remote Procedure Call (RPC), sockets, and/or pipes.

Moreover, in various embodiments the functionality discussed herein canbe implemented using special-purpose circuitry, such as via one or moreintegrated circuits, Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs),or Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). A Hardware DescriptionLanguage (HDL) can, in various embodiments, be employed in instantiatingthe functionality discussed herein. Such an HDL can, as just someexamples, be Verilog or Very High Speed Integrated Circuit HardwareDescription Language (VHDL). More generally, various embodiments can beimplemented using hardwired circuitry without or without softwareinstructions. As such, the functionality discussed herein is limitedneither to any specific combination of hardware circuitry and software,nor to any particular source for the instructions executed by the dataprocessing system.

1. An authentication image, comprising: one or more latent images,wherein the latent images indicate authenticity; and one or morebackground images, wherein the background images work in conjunctionwith the latent images to inhibit unauthorized duplication of theauthentication image, wherein generation of the authentication imageutilizes knowledge of idiosyncrasies of one or more of low-resolutionprint devices or home/office equipment; and wherein authorized softwareuses knowledge regarding the background images and knowledge regardingthe latent images to yield one or more of the latent images from theauthentication image.
 2. The authentication image of claim 1, furthercomprising one or more visible targets, wherein the visible targets aidin said yielding of the latent images from the authentication image. 3.The authentication image of claim 2, wherein the visible targets assistin one or more of glare detection or automatic zooming.
 4. Theauthentication image of claim 2, wherein the visible targets are one ormore of in or adjacent to the authentication image.
 5. Theauthentication image of claim 2, wherein detection of the one or morevisible targets utilizes contour extraction.
 6. The authentication imageof claim 1, wherein one or more of the latent images or the backgroundimages are formulated using image elements.
 7. The authentication imageof claim 6, wherein the image elements include one or more of lines,line segments, dots, spots, or non-imaged areas.
 8. The authenticationimage of claim 6, wherein a first quantity of the image elements arearranged at a first angle and form the one or more background images,and wherein a second quantity of the image elements are arranged at ornear a second angle and form the one or more latent images.
 9. Theauthentication image of claim 1, wherein the authentication image isprinted via a custom font/character set approach.
 10. The authenticationimage of claim 1, wherein the authentication image is associated with atrack and trace element, and wherein the authentication image denotesauthenticity of the track and trace element.
 11. The authenticationimage of claim 1, wherein the authentication image is an onscreenauthentication image, and wherein a validity determination can be madeby pointing a device at a display showing the onscreen authenticationimage.
 12. The authentication image of claim 1, wherein theauthentication image is an onscreen authentication image, wherein theonscreen authentication image is accompanied by a further authenticationimage, wherein the further authentication image is formed via one ofprint, ablation, engraving, or etching, and wherein a validitydetermination can be made by pointing a device at the furtherauthentication image, and at a display showing the onscreenauthentication image.
 13. A system, comprising: at least one processor;and a memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at leastone processor, cause the system to generate the authentication image ofclaim
 1. 14. A computer-implemented method, comprising: generating, by acomputing system, an uncompensated print file for an authenticationimage, wherein printing of the uncompensated print file by alow-resolution print device yields a print result not matching theuncompensated print file; and generating, by the computing system, fromthe uncompensated print file, a compensated print file for theauthentication image, wherein the generation of the compensated printfile utilizes known low-resolution print device idiosyncrasies, andwherein printing of the compensated print file by the low-resolutionprint device yields an authentication image print result that scans asvalid.
 15. The computer-implemented method of claim 14, whereinunauthorized duplication of the authentication image print result incursimage loss.
 16. The computer-implemented method of claim 14, wherein anunauthorized duplicate of the authentication image print result fails toscan as valid.
 17. The computer-implemented method of claim 14, whereinthe authentication image is formulated using consistent or variableimage elements.
 18. The computer-implemented method of claim 14, whereinthe generation of the compensated print file utilizes one or morecompensatory formulas.
 19. The computer-implemented method of claim 14,wherein the compensated print file is generated using a customfont/character set approach.
 20. The computer-implemented method ofclaim 14, wherein the authentication image is formulated using imageelements having a print density that results in one or more ofdisappearance, distortion, or color hue shift where the authenticationimage is subjected to unauthorized duplication.
 21. Thecomputer-implemented method of claim 14, wherein the authenticationimage is formulated using one or more compound image elements, andwherein the compound image elements are split into separate colorlayers.
 22. The computer-implemented method of claim 14, wherein firstportions of the authentication image are printed using a colorantinvisible under regular light, and second portions of the authenticationimage are printed using a colorant visible under regular light.
 23. Asystem comprising: at least one processor; and a memory storinginstructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, causethe system to perform the computer-implemented method of claim 14.